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V. V. Acharya, L. H. Pedersen, T. Philippon, and M. Richardson risk are internalized by each fi nancial institution, the institution will have the incentive to take risks that are supposedly borne by others in the economy. That is, each individual fi rm may take actions to prevent its own collapse but not necessarily the collapse of the entire system. It is in this sense that a fi nancial institution's risk can be viewed as a negative externality on the system. 1 An illustration from the current crisis is that fi nancial institutions took bets on securities and portfolios of loans (such as AAA-rated subprime mortgage-backed tranches), which faced almost no idiosyncratic risk, but large amounts of systematic risk.
As a result, a growing part of the literature argues that fi nancial regulation should be focused on limiting systemic risk, that is, the risk of a crisis in the fi nancial sector and its spillover to the economy at large. Indeed, there is a plethora of recent papers that provides measures of systemic risk in this context. 2 Several papers in particular- Acharya, Pedersen, et al. (2010a ) (hereafter APPR), Korinek (2010) , Morris and Shin (2008) , and Perotti and Suarez (2011) -provide theoretical arguments and explore the optimality properties of a "Pigovian tax" as a potential regulatory solution to the problem of systemic risk.
In these frameworks, each fi nancial institution must face a "surcharge" that is based on the extent to which it is likely to contribute to systemic risk (defi ned, for example, by APPR as the realization of states of the world in which the fi nancial sector as a whole becomes undercapitalized). The idea of systemic risk surcharges is that they provide incentives for the fi nancial fi rm to limit its contributions to systemic risk; that is, to lower its surcharge by reducing size, leverage, risk, and correlation with the rest of the fi nancial sector and the economy.
This chapter analyzes various schemes to estimate such a surcharge: (a) regulatory stress tests of fi nancial institutions that measure their capital losses in adverse scenarios; (b) statistical-based measures of capital losses of fi nancial fi rms extrapolated to crisis periods; (c) pricing of contingent capital insurance for systemic risk, that is, government-run insurance for each fi rm against itself becoming undercapitalized when the fi nancial sector as a whole becomes undercapitalized; and (d) market-based discovery of the price of such risk insurance that fi nancial institutions must purchase partly from the private sector and mostly from the government or the central bank.
While the chapter provides a discussion of each scheme, we perform a detailed analysis of scheme (c). In particular, we provide an explicit calcu- 1 . An analogy can be made to an industrial company that produces emissions that lower its own costs but pollute the environment.
2. See, for example, Acharya, Cooley, et al. (2010b) ; Acharya, Pedersen, et al. (2010a) ; Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) ; Billio et al. (2010) ; De Jonghe (2009); Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2008) ; Gray and Jobst (2009) ; Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) ; Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2005) ; Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) ; Lehar (2005) ; Perotti and Suarez (2011); and Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) , among others. lation formula for contingent capital insurance and illustrate how the systemic risk surcharge varies with the size of the institution, its leverage, risk (equity volatility), and importantly, its correlation with rest of the economy or with the systemically important part of the fi nancial sector. In applying the method to the period prior to the start of the fi nancial crisis in July 2007, the measure of systemic risk sorts well on the fi rms that ended up running aground in the crisis (e.g., only eighteen fi rms show up in the top fi fteen systemic fi rms in all four years from 2004 to 2007). These fi rms are a who's who of the current crisis, including American International Group (AIG), Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Goldman Sachs, Hartford Financial, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Lincoln National, Merrill Lynch, Metlife, Morgan Stanley, Prudential Financial, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual. Moreover, the measure is not just size-based. Many of these fi rms also show up at the top of the list when we reapply the method, while adjusting for their market capitalization.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the recent literature on systemic risk measurement and regulation, focusing in particular on the APPR paper. In the context of the description in section 5.2, section 5.3 describes various approaches to estimating systemic risk surcharges. Section 5.4 presents a detailed analysis of one of the schemes to charge fi nancial fi rms for their systemic risk contributions, which is based on the price of their contingent capital insurance. We provide an exact formula for the price of each fi rm's contingent capital insurance and calibrate it using data prior to the start of the fi nancial crisis beginning in the summer of 2007. Section 5.5 concludes.
Surcharges on Systemic Risk
As described earlier, systemic risk is broadly considered to be the joint failure of fi nancial institutions or markets, which leads to the impairing of the fi nancial intermediation process. In the recent crisis, full-blown systemic risk emerged only when the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and Citigroup, among others, effectively failed in the early fall of 2008. Consider the impact of the fi nancial crisis of 2007 to 2009 on the economy. In the late fall and winter of 2008 and 2009, the worldwide economy and fi nancial markets collapsed. On a dollar-adjusted basis, stock markets fell 42 percent in the United States, dropped 46 percent in the United Kingdom, 49 percent in Europe at large, 35 percent in Japan, and around 50 percent in the larger Latin American countries. Likewise, global GDP fell by 0.8 percent (the fi rst contraction in decades), with a sharp decline in advanced economies of 3.2 percent. Furthermore, international trade fell almost 12 percent. When economists describe the impact of systemic risk, this is generally what they mean.
While the mechanism by which many fi nancial fi rms fail simultaneouslyaggregate shock, a "bank" run, counterparty risk, fi re sales-may differ, the end result is invariably a capital shortfall of the aggregate fi nancial sector. Individual fi rms do not have the incentive to take into account their contribution to this aggregate capital shortfall. By its very nature, therefore, systemic risk is a negative externality imposed by each fi nancial fi rm on the system. A number of researchers and policymakers have argued that a major failure of the current crisis was that existing fi nancial sector regulation seeks to limit each institution's risk seen in isolation and are not sufficiently focused on systemic risk. As a result, while individual fi rm's risks are properly dealt with in normal times, the system itself remains, or is in fact encouraged to be, fragile and vulnerable to large macroeconomic shocks.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a growing literature in economics and fi nance that analyzes the problem of systemic risk of fi nancial fi rms. APPR suggest a methodology to get around this market and regulatory failure and induce fi nancial institutions to internalize the negative externality of systemic risk. Firms are often regulated to limit their pollution or charged based on the externality they cause (see, e.g., the classic regulation theory of Stigler [1971] and Peltzman [1976] ). Similarly, APPR derive a Pigovian tax on fi nancial fi rms' contribution to systemic risk. 3 Specifi cally, in (a) a model of a banking system in which each bank has limited liability and maximizes shareholder value, (b) the regulator provides some form of a safety net (i.e., guarantees for some creditors such as deposit or too-big-to-fail insurance), and (c) the economy faces systemic risk (i.e., system-wide costs) in a fi nancial crisis when the banking sector's equity capitalization falls below some fraction of its total assets and that these costs are proportional to the magnitude of this shortfall, the welfare costs imposed by each fi nancial fi rm can be shown to equal the sum of two components:
Costs to society of the fi nancial fi rm ϭ Expected losses of the fi rm's guaranteed debt upon default ϩ Expected systemic costs in a crisis per dollar of capital shortfall ϫ Expected capital shortfall of the fi rm if there is a crisis.
1. The expected losses upon default of the liabilities that are guaranteed by the government: That is, the government guarantees in the system need to be priced, or, in other words, fi nancial fi rms must pay for the guarantees they receive. Because the price of these guarantees will vary across fi rms due to the fi rm's risk characteristics, the fi rm will choose an optimal level of leverage and risk-taking activities at a more prudent level. Currently, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United States chooses the level of FDIC premiums on a risk-adjusted basis. However, in reality, premiums are only charged when the fund is poorly capitalized so the current FDIC scheme will in general not achieve this optimal policy.
2. The fi rm's contribution to expected losses in the crisis (i.e., the contribution of each fi rm to aggregate losses above a certain threshold) multiplied by the expected systemic costs when the fi nancial sector becomes undercapitalized: The systemic risk also needs to be priced, that is, fi nancial institutions need to internalize the costs of the negative externality imposed on the system. There are two terms to this component of the surcharge. The fi rst term-expected systemic costs-involves estimating the probability of a systemic crisis and the external costs of such a crisis, and represents the level of the surcharge. This can be considered the time-series component of the surcharge. There is substantial evidence on what leads to fi nancial crises and the costs to economies of such crises beyond the impact of a normal economic downturn. 4 The second term-the fi rm's contribution of each institution to the fi nancial sector collapse-measures which institutions pay more surcharge. This can be considered the cross-sectional component of the surcharge. The key ingredient is the expected capital shortfall of the fi rm in a crisis, denoted E(Capital Shortfall Firm i | Crisis).
The main goal of systemic risk surcharges are to incentivize fi rms to limit systemic risk taking or to be well capitalized against systemic risk in order to reduce the cost of these surcharges. In the next section, we describe several approaches to calculating systemic risk surcharges.
Estimating Capital Shortfalls in a Crisis
Within the APPR framework given earlier, calculating the relative contribution of systemic risk surcharges is equivalent to estimating the expected capital shortfall of a fi nancial fi rm in a fi nancial crisis. The fi rm's relative contribution is simply its expected shortfall over the expected aggregate shortfall. Interestingly, if a fi rm had an expected capital surplus in a crisis, then it would actually reduce the systemic costs of the fi nancial sector 4. There is a growing evidence of large bailout costs and real economy welfare losses associated with banking crises. For example, Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2002) estimate output losses somewhere between 10 to 15 percent of GDP; Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) argue that the bailout of the thrift industry in the US in the late 1980s cost $180 billion (3.2 percent of GDP). They also document that the estimated cost of episodes of systemic banking crises were 16.8 percent for Spain, 6.4 percent for Sweden, and 8 percent for Finland. Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) fi nd that countries spent 12.8 percent of their GDP to clean up their banking systems. Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel (1999) , however, set the cost at 15 to 50 percent of GDP. These papers outline the costs of fi nancial crises. Of equal importance is the probability of such crises occurring. In an extensive analysis across many countries and time periods, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, 2008b) look at the factors that lead to banking crises, thus providing some hope of probabilistic assessments of such crises. Borio and Drehmann (2009) study leading indicators for banking systems affected by the current crisis. and should be "subsidized." The intuition is that fi rms that have plenty of capital, less risky asset holdings, or safe funding can still provide fi nancial intermediation services when the aggregate fi nancial sector is weak. In this section, we describe various ways to estimate and consider related measures of E(Capital Shortfall Firm i | Crisis).
This measure is closely related to the standard risk measures used inside fi nancial fi rms, namely value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES). These seek to measure the potential loss incurred by the fi rm as a whole in an extreme event. Specifi cally, VaR is the most that the bank loses with a confi dence level of 1 -␣, where ␣ is typically taken to be 1 percent or 5 percent. For instance, with ␣ ϭ 5%, VaR is the most that the bank loses with 95 percent confi dence. Hence, VaR ϭ -q ␣ , where q ␣ is the ␣ quantile of the bank's return R:
The ES is the expected loss conditional on something bad happening. That is, the loss conditional on the return being less than the ␣ quantile:
Said differently, ES is the average returns on days when the portfolio exceeds its VaR limit. The ES is often preferred because VaR can be gamed in the sense that asymmetric, yet very risky, bets may not produce a large VaR. For risk management, transfer pricing, and strategic capital allocation, banks need to know how their possible fi rm-wide losses can be broken down into its components or contributions from individual groups or trading desks. To see how, let us decompose the bank's return R into the sum of each group's return r i , that is, R ϭ Σ i y i r i , where y i is the weight of group i in the total portfolio. From the defi nition of ES, we see that
From this expression we see the sensitivity of overall risk to exposure y i to each group i:
where MES ␣ i is group i's marginal expected shortfall (MES). The marginal expected shortfall measures how group i's risk taking adds to the bank's overall risk. In other words, MES can be measured by estimating group i's losses when the fi rm as a whole is doing poorly.
These standard risk-management practices are then completely analogous to thinking about the overall risk of the fi nancial system. For this, we can consider the expected shortfall of the overall banking system by letting R be the return of the aggregate banking sector. Then each bank's contribu-tion to this risk can be measured by its MES. Hence, a fi nancial system is constituted by a number of banks, just like a bank is constituted by a number of groups, and it is helpful to consider each component's risk contribution to the whole. As shown in section 5.3.2, MES is an important component of measuring expected capital shortfall.
Government Stress Tests
One of the advantages of the aforementioned approach is that the regulator has a quantifi able measure of the relative importance of a fi rm's contribution to overall systemic risk and thus the percentage of total systemic surcharges it must pay. The surcharge component captures in one fell swoop many of the characteristics, that are considered important for systemic risk such as size, leverage, concentration, and interconnectedness, all of which serve to increase the expected capital shortfall in a crisis. But the surcharge measure also provides an important addition, most notably the comovement of the fi nancial fi rm's assets with the aggregate fi nancial sector in a crisis. The other major advantage of this surcharge component is that it makes it possible to understand systemic risk not just in terms of an individual fi nancial fi rm but in the broader context of fi nancial subsectors. For example, since expected capital shortfall is additive, it is just one step to compare the systemic risk surcharges of, say, the regional banking sector versus a large complex bank.
Most important, however, is the fact that US regulators can implement the aforementioned approach using current tools at their disposal. In particular, stress tests are a common tool used by regulators and are now mandatory under various sets of regulation including both the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and the proposed Basel III accords. Stress tests measure whether fi nancial fi rms will have enough capital to cover their liabilities under severe economic conditions, in other words, an estimate of E(Capital Shortfall Firm i | Crisis).
For example, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) that was initiated in the US in February 2009 and concluded in May 2009 was originated amidst the credit crisis, which had cast into doubt the future solvency of many large and complex fi nancial fi rms. The idea was to conduct a stress test in order to assess the fi nancial ability of the largest US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) to withstand losses in an even more adverse economic environment. The SCAP focused on the nineteen largest fi nancial companies, which combined held two-thirds of assets and more than half of loans in the US banking system, and whose failure was deemed to pose a systemic risk. The goal of the SCAP was to measure the ability of these fi nancial fi rms to absorb losses in the case of a severe macroeconomic shock. In particular, the scenarios were two-years-ahead what-if exercises and considered losses across a range of products and activities (such as loans, investments, mortgages, and credit card balances), as well as potential trading losses and counterparty credit losses. Specifi cally, the stress test measured the ability of a fi rm to absorb losses in terms of its Tier 1 capital, with emphasis on Tier 1 Common Capital "refl ecting the fact that common equity is the fi rst element of the capital structure to absorb losses." Firms whose capital buffers were estimated small relative to estimated losses under the adverse scenario would be required to increase their capital ratios. The size of the SCAP buffer was determined in accordance with the estimated losses under the worst scenario and the ability of a fi rm to have a Tier 1 risk-based ratio in excess of 6 percent at year-end 2010 and its ability to have a Tier 1 Common Capital risk-based ratio in excess of 4 percent at year-end 2010.
The idea of conducting joint stress tests across the largest fi rms was that regulators could cross-check each fi rm's estimate of its own losses across these products and therefore get a more precise and unbiased estimate of what the losses should be. Table 5 .1 summarizes the results for each bank. The main fi nding was that ten of the nineteen original banks needed to raise additional capital in order to comply with the capital requirements set forth in the SCAP. In all ten cases the additional buffer that had to be raised was due to inadequate Tier 1 Common Capital. In total, around $75 billion had to be raised, though there were signifi cant variations across the fi rms ranging from $0.6 to $33.9 billion. The number is much smaller than the estimated two-year losses, which were at $600 billion or 9.1 percent on total loans. The total amount of reserves already in place was estimated to be able to absorb much of the estimated losses. Only using data up to the end of 2008, the required additional buffer that had to be raised was estimated at $185 billion. However, together with the adjustments after the fi rst quarter of 2009, the amount was reduced to $75 billion. It should be clear, however, that in the SCAP the regulators in effect were estimating expected capital shortfalls, albeit under a given scenario and over a limited two-year time period. More generally, the methodology would need to be extended to estimate systemic risk, that is, E(Capital Shortfall Firm i | Crisis). Specifi cally, the fi rst (and most important) step would be to create a range of economic scenarios or an average scenario that necessarily leads to an aggregate capital shortfall. This would be a substantial departure from the SCAP and recent stress tests performed in the United States and in Europe. The question here is a different one than asking whether an adverse economic scenario imperils the system, but instead asks, if the system is at risk, which fi rm contributes to this risk?
In addition, the set of fi nancial fi rms investigated by these stress tests would have to be greatly expanded beyond the current set of large BHCs. This expansion would in theory include insurance companies, hedge funds, possibly additional asset management companies, and other fi nancial companies. This is not only necessary because some of these companies may be important contributors to the aggregate capital shortfall of the fi nancial sector, but also because their interconnections with other fi rms may provide valuable information about estimated counterparty losses. 5 Finally, an important element of a fi nancial crisis is illiquidity, that is, the difficulty in 5 . In order to have any hope of assessing interconnectedness of a fi nancial institution and its pivotal role in a network, detailed exposures to other institutions through derivative contracts and interbank liabilities is a must. This could be achieved with legislation that compels reporting, such that all connections are registered in a repository immediately after they are formed or when they are extinguished, along with information on the extent and form of the collateralization and the risk of collateral calls when credit quality deteriorates. These reports could be aggregated by risk and maturity types to obtain an overall map of network connections. What is important from the standpoint of systemic risk assessment is that such reports, and the underlying data, be rich enough to help estimate potential exposures to counterparties under infrequent but socially costly market-or economy-wide stress scenarios. For instance, it seems relevant to know for each systemically important institution (a) what are the most dominant risk factors in terms of losses and liquidity risk (e.g., collateral calls) likely to realize in stress scenarios; and (b) who its most important counterparties are in terms of potential exposures in stress scenarios. A transparency standard that encompasses such requirements would provide ready access to information for purposes of macro-prudential regulation. converting assets into cash. Basel III has laid out a framework for banks to go through stress test scenarios during a liquidity crisis. It seems natural that liquidity shocks would be part of the "doomsday" scenario of systemic risk. The application of such a scenario would be that fi rms subject to capital withdrawals, whether through wholesale funding of banks, investors in asset management funds, or even (less sticky) policyholders at insurance companies, would have to take a substantial haircut on the portion of its assets that must be sold and are illiquid in light of these withdrawals. Regulators would need to assess both the level of a fi nancial fi rm's systemically risky funding and the liquidity of its asset holdings. Cross-checking against likewise institutions would be particularly useful in this regard.
Statistical Models of Expected Capital Shortfall
A major problem with stress tests is that from a practical point of view the analysis is only periodic in nature and is limited by the applicability of the stress scenarios. Financial fi rms' risks can change very quickly. This problem suggests that the stress tests need to be augmented with more up-to-date information. It is possible to address this question by conducting a completely analogous estimate of systemic risk, that is, E(Capital Shortfall Firm i | Crisis), using state-of-the-art statistical methodologies based on publicly available data. Table 5 .1 summarizes the stress tests of large BHCs conducted by the US government in May 2009. The table also provides statistical estimates of expected equity return losses in a crisis (denoted as MES) and the percentage capital shortfall in the sector (denoted as SRISK) developed by APPR (2010a), Brownlees and Engle (2010) , and the NYU Stern Systemic Risk Rankings described in Acharya, Brownlees et al. (2010) . 6 These estimates are based on historical data on equity and leverage, and statistical models of joint tail risk. Table 5 .1 implies that these estimates, while not perfectly aligned with the stress tests, load up quite well on the fi rms that required additional capital. For example, ignoring General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), for which there is not publicly available stock return data, the eight remaining fi rms in need of capital based on the SCAP belonged to the top ten MES fi rms. Moreover, the fi nancial fi rms that represented the higher percentage of SCAP shortfalls such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, etc., also had the highest levels of the corresponding statistical measure SRISK. That said, there are Type-I errors with the SRISK measure. Alternatively, one could argue that the stress test was not harsh enough, as it did not generate an aggregate capital shortfall.
In order to better understand the statistical measures, note that a fi nancial fi rm has an expected capital shortfall in a fi nancial crisis if its equity value (denote E i ) is expected to fall below a fraction K i of its assets (denote A i ); that is, its equity value plus its obligations (denote D i0 ):
Rearranging into return space, we get the following defi nition:
where the leverage ratio
Estimating the expected capital shortfall in a crisis as a fraction of current equity is paramount to estimation of MES i,t ϭ E t-1 (R i,t | crisis). Of course, there are a variety of statistical methods at one's disposal for estimating this quantity. For example, APPR (2010a) estimate the crisis as the market's worst 5 percent days and derive a nonparametric measure of MES; Brownlees and Engle (2010) condition on daily market moves less than 2 percent, derive a full-blown statistical model based on asymmetric versions of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH), dynamic conditional correlation (DCC), and nonparametric tail estimators, and extrapolate this to a crisis (i.e., to MES); and a number of other researchers develop statistical approaches that could easily be adjusted to measure MES, such as De Jonghe (2010), Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2005) , and Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009), among others. Table 5 .2 ranks the ten fi nancial fi rms contributing the greatest fraction to expected aggregate capital shortfall of the 100 largest fi nancial institutions for three dates ranging from July 1, 2007 , through March 31, 2009 . Estimates of MES are also provided. The methodology used is that of Brownlees and Engle (2010) and the numbers and details are available at www.systemic risk ranking .stern.nyu.edu. The dates are chosen to coincide with the start of the fi nancial crisis (July 1, 2007) , just prior to the collapse of Bear Stearns (March 1, 2008) , and the Friday before Lehman Brothers' fi ling for bankruptcy (September 12, 2008) .
The important thing to take from table 5.2 is that the methodology picks out the fi rms that created most of the systemic risk in the fi nancial system and would be required to pay the greater fraction of systemic risk surcharges. Of the major fi rms that effectively failed during the crisis, that is, either failed, were forced into a merger, or were massively bailed out-Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Bank of America, and Citigroup-all of these fi rms show up early as having large expected capital shortfalls during the period in ques-tion. For example, all but Bank of America, AIG, and Wachovia are in the top ten on July 1, 2007 . And by March 2008, both Bank of America and AIG have joined the top ten, with Wachovia ranked eleventh.
In addition, most of expected aggregate capital shortfall is captured by just a few fi rms. For example, in July 2007, just fi ve fi rms captured 58.2 percent of the systemic risk in the fi nancial sector. By March 1, 2008, however, as the crisis was impacting many more fi rms, the systemic risk was more evenly spread, with 43 percent covered by fi ve fi rms. As the crisis was just about to go pandemic with massive failures of a few institutions, the concentration crept back up, reaching 51.1 percent in September 2008 (where we note that the SRISK percent have been scaled up to account for the capital shortfalls of failed institutions). These results suggest, therefore, that had systemic risk surcharges been in place prior to the crisis, a relatively small fraction of fi rms would have been responsible for those surcharges. As the theory goes, these surcharges would have then discouraged behavior of these fi rms that led to systemic risk.
To the extent systemic risk remains, these levies would have then gone toward a general "systemic crisis fund" to be used to help pay for the remain- ing systemic costs, either injecting capital into solvent fi nancial institutions affected by the failed fi rms or even supporting parts of the real economy hurt by the lack of adequate fi nancial intermediation. Going back to section 5.2, only those losses due to the default of the liabilities that are guaranteed by the government would be covered by a separate FDIC-like fund. The purpose of the systemic crisis fund is not to bail out failed institutions but to provide support to fi nancial institutions, markets, and the real economy that are collateral damage caused by the failed institution.
Contingent Claim Pricing Models of Expected Capital Shortfall
An alternative methodology to estimating expected capital shortfalls would be to set an economic price for such shortfalls, that is, contingent capital insurance. 7 These insurance charges would allow the regulator to determine the proportionate share of expected losses contributed by each fi rm in a crisis (i.e., the relative systemic risk of each fi rm in the sector). This would be used to determine who pays their share of the overall systemic surcharge. The regulator would then take this proportionate share of each fi rm and multiply it by the expected systemic costs of a crisis to determine the level of the surcharge.
Putting aside for the moment who receives the insurance payments, suppose we require (relying on results and insights from APPR) that each fi nancial fi rm take out government insurance against itself becoming undercapitalized when the fi nancial sector as a whole becomes undercapitalized. This would be similar in spirit to how deposit insurance schemes are run. The pricing of such an insurance contract fi ts into the literature on pricing multivariate contingent claims (see, e.g., Margrabe 1978 , Stulz 1982 , Stapleton and Subrahmanyam 1984 , Kishimoto 1989 , Rosenberg 2000 , and Camara 2005 . This literature develops contingent-claim valuation methodologies for cases in which the valuation of claims depends on payoffs that are based on the realizations of multiple stochastic variables. Here, the insurance contract only pays off if the fi nancial institutions' results are extremely poor when the aggregate sector is in distress. 8 To make the argument more formal, let X it and M t be the value of the fi nancial institution i's and the aggregate market's (e.g., fi nancial sector or 7. A related method would be to require fi nancial institutions to hold in their capital structure a new kind of "hybrid" claim that has a forced debt-for-equity conversion whenever a prespecifi ed threshold of distress (individual and systemic) is met. These hybrid securities have been called contingent capital bonds. Examples in the literature of such approaches are: Wall (1989) propose subordinated debentures with an embedded put option; Doherty and Harrington (1997) and Flannery (2005) propose reverse convertible debentures; and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) propose an automatic recapitalization when the overall banking sector is in bad shape, regardless of the health of a given bank at that point.
8. For related contingent claim analyses that focus on the balance sheets of fi nancial institutions, see also Lehar (2005) , Jobst (2009), and Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2008) . public equity market) particular measure of performance (e.g., equity value, equity value / debt value, writedowns, etc.), respectively. It is well-known that the value of any contingent claim that depends on X iT and M T can be written as
where F(и) is the payoff function depending on realizations of X iT and M T at maturity of the claim, and SD T is the stochastic discount factor or the pricing kernel.
Beyond assumptions about the stochastic process followed by the variables, the problem with equation (1) is that it requires estimates of preference parameters, such as the level of risk-aversion and the rate of time discount. Alternatively, assuming continuous trading, one can try and set up a selffi nancing strategy that is instantaneously riskless. Then, as in Black and Scholes (1973) , one can solve the resulting partial differential equation with the preference parameters being embedded in the current value of the assets. Valuation techniques such as Cox and Ross (1976) can then be applied.
Appealing to Brennan (1979) and Rubinstein (1976) , Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1984) show that risk-neutral valuation can be applied in a multivariate setting even when the payoffs are functions of cash fl ows and not traded assets, as may be the case for our setting. In particular, under the assumption that aggregate wealth and the stochastic processes are multivariate lognormal and the representative agent has constant relative risk aversion preferences, one can apply risk neutral valuation methods to the pricing of equation (1). 9 As described earlier, assume that the fi nancial institution is required to take out insurance on systemic losses tied to the market value of equity of the fi rm and the overall sector. Formally, a systemic loss is defi ned by:
1. The market value of the equity of the aggregate fi nancial sector, S MT , falling below K S M .
2. The required payment at maturity of the claim is the difference between some prespecifi ed market value of the equity of the fi nancial institution, K S i , and its actual market value, S iT .
The payoff at maturity T can be represented mathematically as
Obviously, in practice, one of the advantages of this methodology is that it allows for more complex joint distributions that are not multivariate normal such as ones that involve either time varying distributions (e.g., Bollerslev and Engle 1986 , 1988 , Engle 2002 or tails of return distributions described by extreme value theory (e.g., Barro 2006 , Gabaix 2009 , and Kelly 2009 ). The pricing framework would need to be extended for such applications (e.g., Engle and Rosenberg 2002) .
Applying the results in Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1984) , equation (1) can be rewritten as
and S M , S i , and S M are the volatility of the fi nancial sector return, the volatility of the return of the fi nancial institution i, and the correlation between them, respectively. And r is the risk-free rate.
Equation (3) provides one way regulators could set the price for contingent capital insurance. As an illustration, section 5.4 presents a detailed analysis of equation (3) in the context of the fi nancial crisis of 2007 to 2009. As described in section 5.3.2, the insurance charges would be placed in a general systemic crisis fund to be used to help cover systemic costs and not to bail out the failed institution per se. In other words, there is no question of moral hazard here.
Market-Based Estimates of Expected Capital Shortfall
One of the issues with estimating expected capital shortfalls in a crisis is that the statistical approach of section 5.3.2 and the contingent claim methodology of 5.3.3 rely on projecting out tail estimates of capital shortfall of a fi rm to an even more extreme event; that is, when the aggregate sector suffers a shortfall. The assumption is that the cross-sectional pattern amongst fi nancial fi rms is maintained as events get further in the tail of the distribution. This is not necessarily the case. For example, interconnectedness might rear its problems only under the most extreme circumstances. If some fi rms are more interconnected than others, then the estimation and pricing methodology will not capture this feature.
Moreover, measurement errors are likely, especially if some fi nancial fi rms have fatter tail distributions, or face different individual term structure volatilities than other fi rms. A natural way to rectify this problem would be to allow market participants to estimate and trade on these insurance costs. In a competitive market, it is likely that the measurement errors would be reduced.
A market-based approach that uses market prices, assuming market efficiency will refl ect all available information, may be able to uncover the tail distributions and give a more robust estimate of the cross-sectional contribution of each fi rm to aggregate expected capital shortfall. The core idea of a market-based plan to charge for systemic risk is that each fi nancial fi rm would be required to buy private insurance against its own losses in a systemic risk scenario in which the whole fi nancial sector is doing poorly. In the event of a payoff on the insurance, the payment would not go to the fi rm itself, but to the regulator in charge of managing systemic risk and stabilizing the fi nancial sector. This contingent capital insurance cost, however, is not necessarily equal to the systemic risk surcharge. It would be used to determine the proportionate share of each fi nancial fi rm's contribution to the total systemic risk surcharge. The level of the systemic risk surcharge would be determined by the expected systemic costs of a fi nancial crisis times the proportionate share of each fi rm. 10 The important point is that each fi rm's share would be determined by the private market for insurance.
This scheme would in theory not only provide incentives for the fi rm to limit its contributions to systemic risk, but also provide a market-based estimate of the risk (the cost of insurance), and avoid moral hazard (because the fi rm does not get the insurance payoff). The problem with private insurance markets, however, is that they are not set up to insure against systemic risks. By their very nature, systemic risks cannot be diversifi ed away. The underlying capital required to cover these losses, therefore, is quite large even though the possibility of such an event is very small. Examples of this problem can be found in the recent fi nancial crisis with the major monoline insurers, such as Ambac Financial Group and Municipal Bond Insurance Association (MBIA), and, of course, the division of AIG named AIG Financial Products. These monolines guarantee repayment when an issuer 10 . The expected systemic costs may be higher or lower than the contingent capital insurance costs. The insurance costs assume a dollar systemic cost for every dollar of loss of the fi rm in a systemic risk scenario. defaults. Going into the crisis, their businesses focused more and more on structured products, such as asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and collateralized loan obligations, which already represent welldiversifi ed portfolios. Moreover, the majority of insurance was placed on the so-called AAA super senior portions. Almost by construction, the AAA tranches' only risk is systemic in nature. 11 Undercapitalized relative to the systemic event, almost all the monolines and AIG Financial Products were effectively insolvent.
Since the role of the private sector in providing such insurance is primarily for price discovery and the amount of private capital available to provide such systemic insurance is likely to be limited, it seems natural that most of the insurance would be purchased from the government. APPR (2009, 2010b) describe how private-public contingent capital insurance might work in practice. Each regulated fi rm would be required to buy insurance against future losses, but only losses during a future general crisis. For example, each fi nancial institution would have a "target capital" of, say, 8 percent of current assets in the event of a crisis. 12 For every dollar that the institution's capital falls below the target capital in the crisis, the insurance company would have to pay N cents to the regulator (e.g., a systemic risk fund). 13 This way, the insurance provider would have every incentive to correctly estimate the systemic risk of a fi rm in a competitive market and charge the fi rm accordingly. The fi nancial fi rms would need to keep acquiring insurance, and thus pay surcharges, on a continual basis to ensure continual monitoring and price discovery, and to prevent sudden high insurance premiums from causing funding problems because the purchases of premiums are spread out. For example, each month, each fi rm would need to buy a fractional amount of insurance to cover the next fi ve years. Hence, the coverage of the next month would be provided by the insurance purchased over the last fi ve years.
Note that the surcharge proceeds are not meant to bail out failed institutions, but to support the affected real sector and solvent institutions. In other words, to the extent systemic risk still remains once the surcharge has been imposed, the proceeds of the surcharge are to cover systemic risk costs. Future expected bailouts (i.e., government guarantees) need to be priced 11. Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) call these securities economic catastrophe bonds and show that the securities' underlying economics is akin to out-of-the-money put options on the aggregate market.
12. A crisis would be ex ante defi ned by the regulator as a time when the aggregate losses in the fi nancial industry (or the economy at large) exceed a specifi ed amount.
13. N cents represent the proportional share of the private market's participation in the insurance component of the public-private plan. If the proposal were simply contingent capital insurance in which the fi rm got recapitalized if the fi rm were doing poorly in a crisis, then the government's share of the payout to the fi rm would be 100 -N cents on the dollar, and the government would receive (100 -N / 100) percent of the insurance premiums. To avoid double taxation, the fees paid to the insurance company would be subtracted from the fi rm's total systemic surcharge bill paid to the regulator. separately. As described in section 5.2, this portion equals the expected loss on its guaranteed liabilities, akin to the FDIC premium, but they need to be charged irrespective of the size of the resolution fund.
As described before, the major disadvantage of private insurance is that, even for extremely well-capitalized institutions, the insurance sector has struggled for a number of years to provide open-ended (albeit diversifi able) catastrophe insurance. An extensive literature has studied this topic. While the models differ, the primary reason boils down to the inability of insurers to be capitalized well enough to cover large losses. See, for example, the evidence and discussion in Jaffee and Russell (1997) , Froot (2001 Froot ( , 2007 , and Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2008) . The solution in the catastrophe insurance markets has generally been greater and greater backing by the Federal and state governments (e.g., Federal primary coverage against fl oods in 1968, insurance against hurricanes after 1992 by Florida, and earthquake coverage by California after 1994). The idea behind these approaches is that private insurers help price the insurance while the government provides signifi cant capital underlying the insurance.
The question arises whether such public-private insurance markets can exist for systemic risk. While some reinsurance schemes have been looked at by the FDIC, most recently in 1993, with the conclusion that the market is not viable, there do exists such markets today. Financial markets in general have become much more sophisticated in how they develop niche markets. A case in point is that coinsurance programs are not without precedent; indeed, motivated by the events of September 11, 2001 , the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) was fi rst passed in November 2002, and offers federal reinsurance for qualifying losses from a terrorist attack. It remains an open question whether this can be extended to fi nancial crises.
Contingent Capital Insurance and the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009
Section 5.3.3 described a methodology for uncovering the price of expected capital shortfalls of fi nancial fi rms in a crisis. In this section, we explore this idea in greater detail. First, for a given set of parameter values describing the multivariate process for the fi nancial fi rm's stock price and the fi nal sector's stock price, we can estimate the value of the insurance contract using Monte Carlo simulation. We provide some examples and comparative statics to describe some of the underlying economic intuition for the price of this insurance contract. Second, we apply this analysis to the fi nancial crisis of 2007 to 2009. Figure 5 .1 graphs the insurance costs as a percentage of the equity of the fi nancial fi rm as a function of the correlation between the fi rm's equity return and the market return, and as a function of the strike rate of the insur-ance contract. Specifi cally, the payoff is triggered when the market drops 40 percent and the fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) falls below some strike rate, ranging from 1 to 10 percent. For example, 1 percent would be a very weak capital requirement while 10 percent would be strict. We assume the following parameters based on recent history: market volatility of 16 percent, fi rm equity volatility of 27 percent, risk-free rate of 4 percent, and a current fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) equal to 10 percent. The contract has a four-year maturity. Figure 5 .1 shows that the insurance costs are nonlinearly increasing the stronger the capital requirement and the higher the correlation between the fi rm's equity return and the market's return. Most important, these factors interact nonlinearly, so the greatest impact by far is when the trigger takes place closer to 10 percent and the correlation is very high. To better understand the magnitude of the insurance cost, consider a fi rm with $100 billion market value of equity, $1 trillion of assets, highly correlated with the market, and facing a trigger close to 10 percent. Even for these extreme
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Fig. 5.1 The graph depicts simulated insurance charges as a percent of equity as a function of the correlation between the fi rm's equity return and the market return, and as a function of the strike rate of the insurance contract
Notes: Specifi cally, the payoff is triggered when the market drops 40 percent and the fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) falls below the strike rate, ranging from 1 percent to 10 percent (i.e., Ki ϭ 10 to 100). We assume the following parameters based on recent history: market volatility of 16 percent, fi rm equity volatility of 27 percent, risk-free rate of 4 percent, and a current fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) equal to 10 percent. The contract has a four-year maturity. values, the four-year cost is only around $1 billion, which illustrates the fact that the likelihood of both the fi rm and the market collapsing is a rare event.
While clearly the insurance trigger and the correlation are key factors, what else drives the magnitude of the insurance cost? Figure 5 .2 depicts insurance charges as a percent of equity value as a function of the volatility of the fi rm's equity return and the volatility of the market return for three given strike rates of the insurance contract, namely 10 percent, 7.5 percent, and 5 percent. As before, the payoff is triggered when the market drops 40 percent and the fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) falls below the strike rate of 10 percent. We also assume the following parameters based on recent history: correlation between the fi rm equity return and the market return of 55 percent, risk-free rate of 4 percent, and a current fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) equal to 10 percent. The contract again has a four-year maturity. Figure 5 .2 shows the importance of the interaction between fi rm volatility, market volatility, and the triggers. A few observations are in order. First, across the different strike rates, the three-dimensional shape is quite
Fig. 5.2 The graph depicts simulated insurance charges as a percent of equity as a function of the volatility of the fi rm's equity return and the volatility of the market return for a given strike rate of the insurance contract
Notes: Specifi cally, the payoff is triggered when the market drops 40 percent and the fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) falls below the strike rate of 10 percent. We assume the following parameters based on recent history: correlation between the fi rm equity return and the market return of 55 percent, risk-free rate of 4 percent, and a current fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) equal to 10 percent. The contract has a four-year maturity. similar. The pattern shows a highly nonlinear relationship that requires both the fi rm and market volatilities to be high. This should not be surprising given that the payoff occurs only in states where both the fi rm and market are undercapitalized. Second, in comparison to fi gure 5.1, the key factor in determining the insurance cost is the level of volatility. For example, for fi rm and market volatilities of 50 percent and 25 percent, respectively, the insurance costs run as high as 6 percent, 4 percent, and 2 percent of equity Fig. 5.2 (cont.) value for the strike rates of 10 percent, 7.5 percent, and 5 percent. This is important for understanding the properties of contingent capital insurance. Since volatility tends to be procyclical (high in bad times and low in booms), the cost of contingent capital insurance in general will be procyclical as well. Therefore, to reduce procyclicality of insurance charges, the regulator would have to make the strike rates countercyclical (higher strikes in good times), setting the overall insurance cost such as to avoid an overleveraged fi nancial sector and an overheated economy. This design issue is similar to the trade-off the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) must evaluate when setting interest rates.
In the next subsection, we apply the insurance model of section 5.3.3 to available data preceding the fi nancial crisis of 2007 to 2009. In particular, we comment on both the insurance charges and systemic risk contributions that would have emerged if the plan had been put in place during the 2004 to 2007 period.
The Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009
This section empirically analyzes systemic risk surcharges based on contingent capital insurance for US fi nancial institutions around the recent fi nancial crisis. Here, the institutions have been selected according to (a) their role in the US fi nancial sector, and (b) their market cap as of end of June 2007 being in excess of $5 billion. The companies can be categorized into the following four groups: Depository Institutions (e.g., JPMorgan, Citigroup, Washington Mutual, etc.); Security and Commodity Brokers (e.g., Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, etc.); Insurance Carriers (e.g., AIG, Berkshire Hathaway, etc.) and Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service (e.g., Metlife, Hartford Financial, etc.); and a group called Others consists of nondepository institutions, real estate fi rms, and so forth. The total number of fi rms that meet all these criteria is 102. Table 5 .3 contains descriptive year-by-year statistics of the implied insurance charge for these 102 fi rms across the four groups-that is, Depository Institutions, Security and Commodity Brokers, Insurance, and Othersover the period 2004 to 2007. As with the simulations provided in section 5.4.1, the insurance payoff is triggered when the aggregate stock market falls 40 percent, and the payoff is based on the fall in the fi rm's equity value when the ratio of equity value over total assets drops below 10 percent. The amounts are in millions and represent the cost over a four-year period. The main parameter inputs-volatilities and correlations-are estimated over the prior year, and the current ratio of equity value over total assets is computed accordingly from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT.
Several observations are in order. First, there is a clear ordering of the insurance cost across the type of institution. In particular, brokers / dealers face the highest costs every year; insurance companies face the lowest. Sec-ond, for most years, and most of the institution types, there is signifi cant skewness in the cross-section of insurance charges, that is, the mean is multiple times the median. While this fi nding is mostly due to skewness in the distribution of asset size across fi rms, the results of section 5.4.1 showed that high costs are due to simultaneous extreme parameters and the moneyness of the option, properties likely to affect just a few fi rms. Third, there is considerable variation through time in the insurance fees, with a general decline in the level of these fees from 2004 to 2007. The reason for this variation is the general decline of volatilities over this same period.
The latter fi nding points to the need to state a few caveats. Table 5 .3 pro- To the extent conditional normality produces unconditional fat tails, this assumption may not be as unpalatable as it fi rst seems. Nevertheless, there is evidence that return distributions have some conditional fat tailness, which would also increase the level of the insurance fees.
To better understand what determines the fees during this period, table 5.4 provides results of cross-sectional regressions of the insurance charges for each fi rm, both in dollar amounts (panel A) and as a percentage of equity value (panel B) against parameters of interest, including leverage (i.e., the moneyness of the trigger), correlation with the market, the fi rm's volatility, and the institutional form. Generally, across each year, the adjusted Rsquared's roughly double from the mid-twenties to around 50 percent when the institutional form is included in the regression. The broker / dealer dummy is especially signifi cant. This is interesting to the extent that much of the systemic risk emerging in the crisis derived from this sector. Table 5 .4 shows that, as early as 2004, the contingent capital insurance costs of the broker / dealer sector would have been a red fl ag. Table 5 .4 brings several other interesting empirical facts to light. First, in every year, leverage is a key factor explaining the insurance costs across fi rms. This result should not be surprising given that the contingent capital trigger is based on leverage. But if one believes the trigger does capture systemic risk, it suggests that higher capital requirements will have a fi rst-order effect in containing systemic risk. Second, the correlation between the fi rm's return and the market return is a key variable, possibly more important than the fi rm's volatility itself. The reason is that without sufficient correlation the probability that both the fi rm and market will run aground is remote, pushing down the cost of insurance. Finally, table 5.3 showed that there was signifi cant variation in the mean insurance costs from 2004 to 2007. Table  5 .4 runs a cross-sectional stacked regression over the 2004 to 2007 period but also includes market volatility as an additional factor. While the adjusted Rsquared does drop from the mid-twenties in the year-by-year regressions to 16 percent (in panel A) and to 19 percent (in panel B) for the stacked regressions, the drop is fairly small. This is because the market volatility factor explains almost all the time-series variation.
This result highlights an important point about contingent capital insur- Table 5 .5 provides an estimate of this share across the 102 fi rms, and therefore is a measure of the latter component of the systemic risk surcharge. Using the capital insurance charge as its basis, just fi ve fi rms provide over 50 percent of all Notes: This table contains the list of US fi nancial fi rms with a market cap in excess of $5 billion as of June 2007. The fi rms are listed in descending order according to their insurance costs. The insurance payoff is triggered when the market drops 40 percent and the fi rm's ratio of market value of equity to (total liabilities ϩ market equity value) falls below 10 percent at the end of a four-year period. The payoff equals the difference between the equity value implied by the 10 percent ratio and the fi nal equity value. The volatility of the fi rm's equity, the volatility of the market, and the correlation between the two, are estimated using daily data over the prior year. The insurance costs calculation assumes a multivariate normal distribution of equity returns. The fi rst three columns represent, respectively, the insurance charge as a percent of equity, the total dollar insurance charge in millions, and the ranking based on the total dollar amount.
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V. V. Acharya, L. H. Pedersen, T. Philippon, and M. Richardson the risk, and fi fteen fi rms 92 percent of the risk. This is a key fi nding and perhaps not surprising given the outcome of the crisis that followed, namely that most of the systemic risk is concentrated in just a few places. Note that in order of importance, At least nine of these fi rms either failed or required extraordinary capital infusions or guarantees. In fact, probably only JP Morgan (and to a lesser extent, Goldman Sachs) was considered somewhat safe at the height of the crisis in the late fall of 2008 and the winter of 2009. Table 5 .6 shows that this fi nding is not a fl uke by also reporting the rankings of the insurance costs in the earlier periods of 2004, 2005, and 2006 . For example, panel B reports the dollar charges in all four periods and shows that the exact same fi rms (albeit in different order) show up consistently in the top fi fteen. In fact, the only additions to the list are Washington Mutual, AIG, and Lincoln National, two of which failed in the crisis. On a preliminary basis, these results suggest that a measure like the one calculated here (i.e., the cost of contingent capital insurance), does a good job of deciphering which fi rms are systemic and should pay the share of the surcharge. Of some importance, panel A shows that these rankings are not solely size-based as most of these fi rms also show up on a percentage of equity basis as well, and APPR provide more extensive evidence of this type for predicting the realized performance of fi nancial fi rms during the stress test (SCAP) exercise, the crisis period of 2007 to 2009, and other crises of the past.
The APPR approach to measuring systemic risk has its limitations. The basic assumption in that paper is that the negative externality gets triggered in a proportional amount to each dollar of aggregate capital that falls below the aggregate capital threshold level. Therefore, irrespective of the type of fi nancial institution or how that institution is funded, its capital loss contribution is treated the same below the threshold. To take just one example, in table 5.5, large insurance companies like Metlife, Prudential Financial, and Hartford Financial show up as systemically quite risky. Their presence is due to their large offerings of guaranteed investment products that exposed them to aggregate risk and a large MES. Is this a fair outcome? While their funding via insurance premiums is stickier than a large bank, which relies on wholesale funding, it is not obvious that these fi rms do not pose systemic risk. For example, insurance premiums represent almost 10 percent of GDP, insurance policies are subject to limited runs and, most important, as the largest buyer of corporate debt, insurance companies provide an important fi nancial intermediation service. Disruptions in any of these activities would have important consequences. A fi nal comment on the APPR concept of systemic risk is that the basic intuition is all fi nancial fi rms are part of the entire system in that well-capitalized fi nancial institutions could take over poorly capitalized institutions. This is, of course, not possible when aggregate capital losses exceed a large enough threshold.
Concluding Remarks
Based on a recent literature that focuses on systemic risk surcharges, the centerpiece underlying these surcharges is the measurement of a fi rm's share of expected losses conditional on the occurrence of a systemic crisis. In this chapter, we describe and analyze various ways to estimate these expected capital shortfalls. As an example of one particular way to measure the fi rm's share of systemic risk, we analyze the pricing of contingent capital insurance from both a theoretical and empirical point of view. Using the current crisis as an illustration, the measure appears to successfully choose the systemic fi rms, consistent with recent statistical-based measures of systemic risk (e.g., APPR 2010a and Brownlees and Engle 2010, among others).
